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TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH:
Appellant respectfully urges that Respondents' Petition
for a Rehearing in this case be denied on the following grounds:
1.

Respondents have failed to show a proper ground for

rehearing in that their petition is not based on any matter
not already before this Court when it rendered its opinion or
that was not available to Respondents to present at some
earlier point in this case.
2.

Respondents have failed to meet their burden of

showing this
Court overlooked a material fact, based its decision
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

2 -

on a wrong principle of law, misapplied or overlooked anything
materially affecting the result reached in its decision, or
erred in its conclusions of law.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully
urges that Respondents' Petition for Rehearing be denied.
DATED

this~~-day

of September, 1978.

J. BLAINE ZOLLINGER
Logan City Attorney
Attorney for Appellant

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK

By

1
&

McDONOUGH I

~S~U-Z_A_NN-=E~M-.~D-AL
___L_I~M-0-R~E~~~~~~-i
Attorneys for Appellant
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NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION
Appellant here responds to Respondents' Petition for
Rehearing filed August 2, 1978, urging that this Court rehear
and reconsider its opinion rendered on the 13th day of July,
1978.

Respondents urge rehearing of those portions of this

Court's decision that reverse the First Judicial District
court's Summary Declaratory Judgment, which judgment construed
and interpreted Utah's Optional Forms of Municipal Government
Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act" or the "Optional
Mayor-Council Act").
Respondents seek relief in the form of a new opinion
from this Court that sustains the lower court's Summary Declaratory Judgment, in accord with the dissent of Judge Crockett
filed in this Court's opinion, or, in the alternative, for an
Order expressly finding the statutes in question ambiguous
and remanding the case to the lower court for the purpose of
receiving evidence pertinent to the resolution of the arnbigui ties so found.

Appellant seeks the denial of Respondents'

Petition for Rehearing on the grounds alleged above as are
more fully supported in the Appellant's accompanying Brief.
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- 4 STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant agrees that the substantive facts relating
to this Petition for Rehearing are accurately reflected in the
record of the case that was before this Court when it rendered
its opinion on July 13, 1978.
Appellant objects, however, to Respondents' elaboration
of "procedural facts", in that that is not a statement of facts
at all but is rather unsupported argument in favor of Respondents' position on its Petition for Rehearing.
The procedural facts that are pertinent to this
Court's determination of Respondents' position are rather
as follows:
1.

Respondents (Plaintiffs below) filed a Complaint

in the First Judicial District Court for the State of Utah
seeking a judicial declaration of the respective rights,
duties and powers of the municipal council and the mayor of
Logan City under the Utah's Optional Mayor-Council Act.
2.

Appellant (Defendant below) moved to dismiss that

action, which motion was denied.

There were various procedural

machinations regarding motions to strike and to dismiss filed
by both parties.
3.

Respondents moved for summary judgment on nearly

every count in the claims alleged in their Complaint, and
stipulated that there were no material issues of fact with
respect to the construction of the Act to obtain a ruling on
their Motion for Summary Judgment.

Respondents did not seek

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

5 -

an evidentiary hearing on the key question of the separation
of powers under the Act which question necessarily involved
the issue of who, the mayor or the council, had the power to
dispose of and make determinations with respect to real
property.
4.

The lower court issued an interim memorandum

decision granting partial declaratory summary judgment on
certain of Respondents' claims, reserving other of the claims
involving factual matters going to the actual disputes between the parties for evidentiary hearing.
5.

After the evidentiary hearing on these issues,

at which time Respondents did introduce evidence going toward
the basic questions of interpretation of the Act, for example,
the Ballot Title upon which the citizens of Logan City had
voted in adopting the Optional Mayor-Council Act, the lower
court issued a final declaratory summary judgment ruling
in favor of Plaintiffs' positions on virtually all their
claims.
6.

Appellants appealed from the lower court decision

and both parties filed briefs.

This Court received amicus

briefs from two of the Logan Municipal Councilmen and from
certain legislators, including a sponsor of the optional
Mayor-Council Act.

All briefs argued the law governing

questions of statutory interpretation, the history and context
and development of the Optional Mayor-Council Act.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Neither in their brief nor at oral argument did

Respondents urge that an express finding of ambiguity was necessary before the legislative intent behind the Act could be
considered by this Court, or that Respondents had been or would
be denied due process if legislative intent were considered.
This was the case even though Respondents filed their brief
nearly one month after the legislator's amicus brief was filed
and directly addressed the amicus position on legislative
intent in their appeal brief.
8.

On July 13, 1978 this Court rendered its opinion

reversing the lower court in ruling in favor of the position
urged by Appellant with respect to the proper interpretation
and application of the Optional Mayor-Council Act.
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BRIEF
POINT I
RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW
A PROPER GROUND FOR REHEARING
IN THAT THEIR PETITION IS NOT
BASED ON ANY MATTER NOT ALREADY
BEFORE THIS COURT OR THAT WAS
NOT AVAILABLE TO RESPONDENTS AT
SOME EARLIER POINT IN THIS CASE.
It is clear that the Utah Supreme Court has never
favored petitions for rehearing and that a heavy burden is upon
those seeking a rehearing of a decision from this Court to justify
it on a proper ground.
299 (1886).

~,

In Re MacKnight, 4 u. 237, 9 P.

Petitions for rehearing will be denied when the

petitioners offer nothing new and important for reconsideration
~the

court.

Docheneau v. House, 4 U. 43~, 11 P. 618 (1886);

Jones v. House, 4 U. 484, 11 P. 619 (1886).

Petitions for re-

hearing will not be granted even on the basis of totally new
issues and arguments if those points and arguments were avail, able to the petitioners to have presented to the court at any
prior stage of the proceeding.

Such new matters will not even

be considered by the court on a petition for rehearing.
In

~'

Re Lowe's Estate, 68 U. 49, 249 P. 128 (1926); Western Securi-

ties Co. v. Silver King Consol. Mine Co., 57 U. 88, 192 P. 664
(1920); Dahlquist v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 52 U. 438,
174 P. 833

(1918).
Respondents base their petition for rehearing on

several arguments, all of which were either pointed out to
the lower court as shown by the record on appeal, or in
Respondents' appeal brief, or in oral argument before this
Court.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Respondents make much of the argument that unless
and until there is an express finding that a statute is ambiguous,
no matters beyond the express language of the enactment, particularly legislative intent, may be considered,

However,

the very basis for this action was that Logan City officials
were not clear from the terms of the Optional Mayor-Council Act
as to the scope of their respective powers and duties.

Appellant

argued in its appeal brief that the lower court had misconstrued
the Act.

Appellant argued that the Act's language must be viewed

in light of other Utah statutes and of the intent of the legislature in enacting the overall statutory s9heme.
Respondents' brief urged that the express language
of the Act, particularly of the 1975 version where it referenced
"governing body" decided the issue, as was the basis for the
lower court's judgment.

Respondents' brief did not urge that

the question of interpretation or application of the Act was
improperly before this Court on appeal in that no express finding of ambiguity had been made as it now urges in its petition
for rehearing.

Indeed, Respondents' brief explicitly traced

the history of the Act from the 1975 version through the 1977
amendments, and expressly referred to legislative intent in
several places.

(See e.g., Brief of Respondents

at pp. 22, 23, 28).
Moreover, Respondents addressed the amicus brief
filed by the legislative general counsel which brief dealt with
the propriety of considering legislative intent, and with the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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actual intent behind the Act.

Again, Respondents did not urge

that the issue could not be considered absent an express finding
that the Act is ambiguous.
Consequently, all of the arguments that Respondents
make with respect to the necessity of finding an ambiguity
in the statute were available to it at the briefing stage of
this appeal.

Having not raised the issue then, Respondents

may not now urge the point as a ground upon which rehearing
can be granted.
Respondents make the somewhat incredible argument
that they have been denied procedural due process by virtue
of this Court's rendering an opinion based upon the record
before it.

Respondents' argument is that this Court's receipt

of the legislators' amicus brief constituted the receipt of
evidence of legislative intent that was not presented to the
trial court below and upon which this Court impermissibly
relied.

This, Respondents urge, denied them the right to

confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to present their
i own "evidence" of legislative intent.

As will be seen in Point II of this brief, this
Court properly received and properly used the amicus brief
filed by the Utah State legislators.

Moreover, the amicus

brief contained nothing that could even remotely be characterized
as evidentiary.

It contained arguments only of the proper laws

of statutory interpretation, the history of the Act, and the
context in which it was enacted.

These are matters which this

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Court has repeatedly held are proper matters of consideration.
~'Parker

v. Rampton, 27 U.2d 36, 497 P.2d 848 (1972).

But more importantly, the argument that due process
was denied was available to Respondents at the initial briefing
stages of this appeal.

Appellant believes that Respondents

did not there raise it because they could not, having waived
the point by themselves filing for declaratory relief, having
moved for summary judgment and having stipulated that there was
no material issue of fact with respect to proper application and
interpretation of the Optional Mayor-Council Act.
It is ridiculous for
been denied their day in Court.

Respondent~

to claim they have

They are held to have known

that this Court places a heavy premium on ascertaining legislative intent whenever the meaning of a statute is called into
question.

~'

Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 U.2d 337,

411 P.2d 831 (1966).

Clearly intent became important the

instant Respondents filed their Complaint.
If Respondents had thought it material to introduce
below individual legislator's testimony, journals, records
or any other facts pertinent to intent, they could have done
so.

They did not.

They may not, therefore, now urge their

failure to introduce evidence as a ground for a rehearing.
Respondents argue that this Court has essentially
decided this appeal arbitrarily.

Again, the issue of the

arbitrariness of this Court's opinion turns on the validity
Respondents' previously available argument that an express
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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finding of ambiguity was necessary, and secondly, upon the
validity the Respondents' argument that it therefore follows
' that they were denied due process.

As none of Respondents'

premises constitute new matters not available to them at least
at the initial briefing stages of this appeal, it follows that
their conclusion of arbitrariness is similarly vulnerable.
Respondents raise many points of law that they claim
this Court decided erroneously, including the legislature's
power over real property and the proper rules of statutory
construction to be applied to this case.

All of these points

1 were argued exhaustively by Respondents before the court below,
' and before this Court.

This Court had the benefit of all ar-

gwnents and authorities and ruled accordingly.

None of these

matters, therefore, is new, and, as will be seen under Point
II, Respondents have not met their burden of convincing this
Court that it ruled improperly on any of them.

Again, these

arguments provide no justification for a rehearing.

Respondents'

argument on rehearing is essentially and fundamentally that
' they are disappointed with the majority decision in this Court.
' This Court didn't rule in favor of the Respondents, and they
simply do not like it.

They wish the majority had accepted

Justice Crockett's view, who ruled to Respondents' liking
apparently on the same record as the rest of the Court.
This Court has held that it is not a proper ground
for rehearing that counsel is dissatisfied with the result as

hr
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This Court will not rehear a

case simply to drop points or to adopt other conclusions based
upon what might or might not be satisfactory to counsel seeking
the rehearing.

Beaver County v. Home Indemnity, 88

u.

1, 52

P.2d 435 (1935).
Appellant respectfully urges that Respondents' arguments for rehearing do not raise one new material point not
available to Respondents before.

Therefore, totally aside from

any consideration of the meritoriousness or the legal accuracy
of Respondents' arguments, they have simply not alleged any
proper ground upon which this Court can

gr~nt

a rehearing.

For this reason alone, Appellant respectfully urges that Respondents' petition for rehearing be denied.
POINT II
RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO MEET
THEIR BURDEN OF SHOWING THIS COURT
HAS OVERLOOKED A MATERIAL FACT, BASED
ITS DECISION ON A WRONG PRINCIPLE OF
LAW, MISAPPLIED ANYTHING MATERIALLY
AFFECTING THE RESULT REACHED IN ITS
DECISION OR ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW.
As was noted above, the burden is heavy upon the
petitioners seeking a rehearing to convince the court of the
following:
point;

(1) that it failed to consider some material

(2) that it erred in its cinclusions of law;

(3) that

petitioner has discovered some new matter, some new position
and point of law overlooked before that was unknown at the
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origination of the appeal and which properly ought to be considered by the court in connection with the opinion rendered.
In Re MacKnight, 4 U. 237, 9 P. 299

(1886).

Appellant has shown that Respondents' arguments contain
nothing not available to them before.

Consequently, they must

convince this Court that it erred, overlooked or misapplied
proper rules of law.

This too they have failed to do.

Respondents rely heavily upon the legal argument
that as a matter of statutory construction there must be an
1

1

express finding that a statute is ambiguous before any extraneous
matters, including any questions of legislative intent can be

' looked to by the court in construing the statute.

Respondents

urge that this follows from an established rule of statutory
construction characterized as the "plain and unambiguous rule."
The plain and unambiguous rule is almost universally
accepted, and provides that where the meaning of a statute is
unequivocally clear, the court will not look beyond it to create
an ambiguity.

However, Respondents have misconstrued the applica-

tion of the rule.

It does not follow from the rule that all

statutes are presumed plain and unambiguous unless and until
some party points out and claims upon an alleged ambiguity and
the court thereafter expressly finds such an ambiguity to exist.
It does not follow that any statute capable of an interpretation
is therefore plain and unambiguous.

Rather, the rule provides

that there are certain terms and phrases that all reasonable men
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only mean one thing in the
they are found.

context of the statute in which

In such a case, it is obvious that the courts

will not allow a party, who disagrees with the plain and unambiguous meaning of a statute and wishes it to have a different
meaning, to introduce evidence creating an ambiguity.

That is

not the same as requiring that a party expressly point out to
the court what the ambiguity is and that the court so affirmatively find before any evidence pertinent to the interpretation
of the phrase or statute is receivable.

No Utah Supreme Court

case has ever held that a court must affirmatively or expressly
on the record find the existence of an ambiguity before it can
look to matters beyond the actual statutory words as an aid to
interpretation.
Respondents' argument that there was no ambiguity
in the Optional Mayor-Council Act is patently absurd.

There

was a sufficient ambiguity in the statute to give rise to Respondents' filing a complaint containing nine separate counts
alleging actual disputes between members of the Logan City
Municipal Council and the Mayor of Logan City in interpreting
their respective powers under the Optional Mayor-Council Act.
Respondents raised the issue of the ambiguity and in fact
claimed under it by filing their Complaint for declaratory relief.
The trial court expressly found that the questions raised by
Respondents' Complaint were properly subject to declaratory
relief in that not only was there a statutory interpretation inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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valved (necessarily implying an ambiguity), but that actual
,

~y-to-day

real disputes existed between the council and mayor

as to what powers and duties the act imposed upon them to warrent
a,~claratory

relief.

at pp. 4-6).

(See Final Declaratory Sununary Judgment

No error on the part of this Court in looking to

proper matters of legislative intent is therefore made out.
Given that Respondents' argument as to the necessity
of an express finding of ambiguity and the failure of the lower

court to so find is incorrect, every argument that follows from
that incorrect premise is also fallacious. Respondents' next
argument is that this Court improperly looked at and considered
a brief in the form of an arnicus curiae filed on behalf of certain state legislators going into questions of legislative
intent.

The Utah court has held repeatedly that where a statute

is unclear (as it obviously was in this case) the court would
properly look to the reasons for and the history of the enactment to determine legislative intent.
U.2d 36, 497 P.2d 848

Parker v. Rampton, 28

(1972).

Indeed, Respondents themselves pointed out the
history of the Act as being material to its construction in
their brief on appeal at p. 10.

This Court, therefore, properly

allowed the amicus brief to be filed, the brief was filed in a
proper form serving the classic function of an arnicus to aid ·
the Court in understanding certain areas with respect to intent
that were necessary to the Court's interpretation of the statute
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the court as background for its decision.
From Respondents' fallacious premise that an express
finding of ambiguity is somehow a condition precedent to the
consideration of any legislative intent, they move to their
next fallacious premise that legislative intent was improperly
expressed in the amicus brief, and from that, to their fallacious conclusion that Respondents were denied due process because improper evidence worked its way into this Court's opinion.
To state Respondents' argument is to disprove it.

As the question

of the application and interpretation of the Optional Mayor-Council
Act was at issue, the statute obviously was unclear.

As the

statute was unclear, it was proper for this Court to consider
all correct elements of legislative intent.

Correct elements of

legislative intent were properly expressed and in proper form
in the amicus brief filed by the legislators.

The Court's

opinion which touched upon the amicus brief as background and
history only, was a proper use of the matters contained in the
amicus brief.

It, therefore, follows that at every step of

this appeal, the proceedings have been completely proper and
have done no harm to Respondents except that the decision was
not the one that they sought.
Respondents' due process argument, of course, also
alleges that they were denied the opportunity to present witnesses as to legislative intent.

It is abundantly clear, as

has been argued before this Court in the past, that individual
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- 17 opinions of single legislators are not proper considerations
going to legislative intent.

~, Castenada-Gonzalez v. Irrunigration

, and Naturalization Service, 564 F.2d 417, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1977); See also,
Jensen v. Matheson, Supreme Court Case No. 15826, July 27, 1978.
It follows, therefore, that Respondents cannot claim
a denial of due process on the basis of their inability to
introduce witnesses whose testimony would never have been
, material to any stage of the proceeding.

Indeed, Respondents

did in fact introduce evidence at the trial court level going
1

to the legislative intent behind the statute in the form of
the Ballot Title upon which the citizens of Logan City voted.
In short, Respondents' arguments based on ambiguity,
improper evidence and arbitrary decision by this Court and the
denial of due process are all completely unsound.

Therefore,

Respondents have not met their burden of showing that on any
of these bases the Court acted erroneously.
Respondents further argue that as a matter of law,
the Court improperly applied the federal and state models with
respect to the proper separation of power even if it correctly
characterized the Logan City form of government as a true
separate powers form of government.

Respondents focus on the

question of the power to buy and sell real property as distinguished from the power to make general policy with respect
to its ultimate disposition.

Respondents' argument basically

is that the respective Constitution of the United States and
of the State of Utah give their respective legislative bodies
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- 18 "plenary" power over the disposition of public lands.
As was argued in Appellant's brief at the outset of
this appeal, however, the question is not what the Utah state
legislature or the Congress of the United States has power to
do but what the municipal council of Logan has power to do.
Appellant argued that the grant of power in this case was state
statute which provided the fundamental legal basis, sort of a
quasi constitution, for Logan City government.
Upon proper application and interpretation of the
statutes granting power to the municipalities in the State of
Utah, this Court ruled that the mayor has power over the disposition of real property as an executive power under the
statutory scheme of a separate-powers form of government in Logan
City.

The Court had before it all the arguments of law per-

tinent to the point as presented by Appellant and Respondents.
What Respondents are doing is re-arguing their position with respect to the power over real property.

Again,

Appellant urges that Respondents' only real grievance with the
opinion issued from this Court is that it did not favor Respondents.

Consequently, Appellant believes that Respondents

have not urged any meritorious basis for a rehearing on the
real property question.
Finally, Respondents urge that the opinion of Justice
Hall has misapplied or ignored all of the fundamental rules of
statutory interpretation.

Interestingly, throughout their briefs
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- 19 Respondents do not cite specific Utah cases that deal with
what specific canons of statutory construction this Court is
obligated to apply.

Rather, Respondents rely heavily on general

treatises that address principles adopted throughout the country
in varying degrees in varying courts.

The appropriate rules

of statutory construction were argued by Appellant in its initial brief, and were pointed out again by amicus in their brief
on behalf of the state legislators.

The Utah law on this sub-

ject provides that legislative intent must be looked to and
specifically states to what sources of legislative intent this
Court might look.
337,

~,

Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 U.2d

411 P. 2d 831 (1966).
The ambiguity in the statute at issue here

does not

depend on any hypertechnical narrow rule of construction such
as those urged by Respondents.

What is at issue here, placed

in issue by Respondents' filing their claim for declaratory
relief, is the overall, general application of an entire
statutory scheme both specifically as its language applies
and generally as modified and in the context of the overall
grants of power to municipal governments.
This Court found that the lower court had improperly
construed this statutory scheme by focusing too narrowly on
specific words such as "governing body" without viewing the
entire statutory framework.

This Court then proceeded to view

the entire statutory framework to put all phrases and all allocaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 20 -

tions of power in the proper context.

That was what this Court

was obligated to do by the issues raised in the context of the
proceedings below and on this appeal.
This Court applied not only the proper rules of
statutory construction but the only rules of statutory construction material to the issues before it.

Again, Appellant

urges that Respondents are objecting not to the method by which
this Court reached its conclusion, but the conclusion reached
in that it was not favorable to Respondents.
spondents urge
Crockett.

Indeed, Re-

that this Court adopted the opinion of Justice

Appellant frankly cannot see where Justice Crockett

specifically and methodically applied those canons of
construction urged by Respondents as proper.

Indeed, it appears

that Justice Crockett applied the very same method that the rest
of this Court applied, that of viewing the statutory scheme as
a whole in context and came to a differing conclusion.

It is

the conclusion with which Respondents agree, they have no objection with his method so that it appears that they should
have no objection to the majority's method of arriving at its
conclusion.
From the foregoing, it appears that Respondents have
not met their burden of convincing this Court that it erroneously
applied any rule of law.

Nor have they shown to the satisfaction

of anyone that this Court failed to consider any material point.
Nor have they shown that some newly discovered point of law is
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pertinent and overriding.

All Respondents have done is urge

that this Court erred by not agreeing with their position.
This court has never held that to be a proper ground for
rehearing, and certainly it is not so in the instant case.
For the above reasons, therefore, Appellant respectfully urges
that Respondents' petition for rehearing be denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this~~~day

of September, 1978.

J. BLAINE ZOLLINGER
Logan City Attorney
Attorney for Appellant

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By

_S_U_Z_AN~N-E-M~.~D~AL,,...,....,L~I=M~O=R=E=-~~~,,...,....,,,...,....,~~~

Attorneys for Appellant
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